Cabanas Vs Pilapil

Cabanas Vs Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974




FACTS: The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.


Issue: WON the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary


Held: on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.


With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle


Source: FULL TEXT http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jul1974/gr_l_25843_1974.html

Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956

Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956] 

Facts:  Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant ,requested said stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.

Issue  : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity


Held:   They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National CoconutCorporation. While it was organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote thecoconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it wasmade subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it mayexercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly said, ³The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public. the term ³Government of the Republic of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of thegovernment are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court

 Source : FULL TEXT http://www.scribd.com/doc/36132697/BACANI-vs-NAcoco

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978 FACTS: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.

ISSUE” WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision Constitutional

HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.

Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L-25246 September 12 1974

FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow “Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization” Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.) CASE DIGEST

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank,

 G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.

FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.[   This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger.  Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused.  Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted their membership. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the matter.  When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto. After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee.  However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.

HELD: All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms.  However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement.

ANTONIO Y. CABASARES VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO JR. (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011) CASE DIGEST

ANTONIO Y. CABASARES, VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, JR.,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western Samar,

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011

FACTS:The records disclose that on February 21, 1994, Cabasares filed a Complaint for Malicious Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. s early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time the complaint was filed on November 6, 2009respondent Judge claimed that he only came to know of the present administrative complaint against him on December 7, 2009, thru Atty. Elizabeth Tanchioco, head of the Performance Audit Team at MTCC, Calbayog City.  On the second day of the audit, he left for Tacloban City upon advice of his doctor and was confined at Divine Word Hospital because of high blood pressure from December 10-13, 2009.  Thereafter, he was on leave from December 14-17, 2009 and returned to work only on December 18, 2009. Since it was Christmas time and due to his heavy workload, the case slipped his mind Later, however, a decision on the case was prepared and promulgated on January 14, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violates Section 15 Article VIII of the constitution.

HELD: A judge is expected to keep his own record of cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and promptly. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Complementary to this constitutional provision is Canon 1, Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct which instructs that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Similarly, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.  All cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission. The Court, in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options. 

Adiong Vs Comelec

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Source (FULL TEXT) : http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/mar1992/gr_103956_1992.html