Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.) CASE DIGEST

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank,

 G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.

FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.[   This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger.  Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused.  Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted their membership. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the matter.  When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto. After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee.  However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.

HELD: All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms.  However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement.

ANTONIO Y. CABASARES VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO JR. (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011) CASE DIGEST

ANTONIO Y. CABASARES, VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, JR.,

Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

8th Judicial Region, Calbayog City, Western Samar,

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011

FACTS:The records disclose that on February 21, 1994, Cabasares filed a Complaint for Malicious Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. s early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time the complaint was filed on November 6, 2009respondent Judge claimed that he only came to know of the present administrative complaint against him on December 7, 2009, thru Atty. Elizabeth Tanchioco, head of the Performance Audit Team at MTCC, Calbayog City.  On the second day of the audit, he left for Tacloban City upon advice of his doctor and was confined at Divine Word Hospital because of high blood pressure from December 10-13, 2009.  Thereafter, he was on leave from December 14-17, 2009 and returned to work only on December 18, 2009. Since it was Christmas time and due to his heavy workload, the case slipped his mind Later, however, a decision on the case was prepared and promulgated on January 14, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violates Section 15 Article VIII of the constitution.

HELD: A judge is expected to keep his own record of cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and promptly. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Complementary to this constitutional provision is Canon 1, Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct which instructs that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Similarly, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.  All cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission. The Court, in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options. 

Adiong Vs Comelec

ADIONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 103956
March 31, 1992

FACTS: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos. 6646 and 7166 and other election laws. Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. â€” The following are lawful election propaganda:

(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals… Provided, That decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

It is unlawful:…

(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards…

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections assails the COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixes.

HELD: The petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the COMELEC providing that “decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof” is DECLARED NULL and VOID. The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him.

Also, the questioned prohibition premised on the statute (RA 6646) and as couched in the resolution is void for overbreadth. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle (The provisions allowing regulation are so loosely worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one’s living room or bedroom.) In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. (The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a “liberty” interest, the burden of justification on the part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.)

Additionally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, mandated by Article II, Section 26 and Article XIII, section 1 in relation to Article IX (c) Section 4 of the Constitution, is not impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas, tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate.

In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.

Source (FULL TEXT) : http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/mar1992/gr_103956_1992.html