Biyernes, Agosto 3, 2012

Lino Vs Pano


HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,
 petitioners, vs
. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,
respondents
.
G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.  He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.  This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.  In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.  This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.  Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.  The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties



G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, 
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

 
FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No
Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Source: Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_111097_1994.html

Biyernes, Hulyo 13, 2012

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque


Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines   vs. Duque


Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.


Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;


Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

source: Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_173034_2007.html

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083







Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083
Fact:


a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."


The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:


1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.


Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.


Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?


HELD: YES


petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.


The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment

Biyernes, Hulyo 6, 2012

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

 G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

 Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

 Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimant’s actiononly up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,asappropriated by law

source: Full Text http://balaod.wordpress.com/2006/07/31/republic-vs-guillermo-p-villasor-et-al/

Lasco vs UNRFNRE

Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995




Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

source: full text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/gr_109095_109107_1995.html

Biyernes, Hunyo 29, 2012

AGLIPAY Vs RUIZ



AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

Source : Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/mar1937/gr_l-45459_1937.html