Lino Vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,

 petitioners, vs

. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,

respondents

.

G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto.  He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet.  This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996.  The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.  In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON  Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid.  This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government’s.  However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress.  Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress.  As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress.  The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Source: Full Text http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/aug2001/129093.htm

Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, 

vs.

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION,

 FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement

ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid

HELD: No

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Source: Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/jul1994/gr_111097_1994.html

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines   vs. Duque


Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.


Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;


Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

 Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature

source: Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/oct2007/gr_173034_2007.html

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083

Oposa vs. Factoran, G.R. 101083
Fact:


a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."


The complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:


1] Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
2] Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.


Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.


Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action?


HELD: YES


petitioners have a cause of action. The case at bar is of common interest to all Filipinos. The right to a balanced and healthy ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies the judicious management of the country’s forests. This right is also the mandate of the government through DENR. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.


The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment

source: Full text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jul1993/gr_101083_1993.html

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR, ET AL.

 G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

 Facts: On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince, Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay andallowances of military and civilian personneland for maintenance and operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the notices and garnishment arenull and void.

Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?

 Held: What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of theConstitution.It isa fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from suit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had been previously granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limitclaimant’s actiononly up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsand properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,asappropriated by law

source: Full Text http://balaod.wordpress.com/2006/07/31/republic-vs-guillermo-p-villasor-et-al/

Lasco vs UNRFNRE

Case Digest_Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995

Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for NaturalResourcesExploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of theUnited Nations.The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of thePhilippineGovernment and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island.Petitioners are thecomplainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since itenjoyed diplomatic immunity.

Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunitiesof the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall makea provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which thespecialized agencyisa party.´ Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in thePhilippines.Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by thePhilippine Government and theUnited Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland

source: full text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/feb1995/gr_109095_109107_1995.html

AGLIPAY Vs RUIZ

AGLIPAY Vs. RUIZ

G.R. No. L-45459             March 13, 1937

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing

ISSUE : WON the selling of stamps in commemorating the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress. constitutional

HELD: YES .The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people

Source : Full Text http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1937/mar1937/gr_l-45459_1937.html

Cabanas Vs Pilapil

Cabanas Vs Pilapil
G.R. No. L-25843 July 25, 1974




FACTS: The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed on October 10, 1964. The defendant, Francisco Pilapil, is the brother of the deceased. The deceased insured himself and instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death, the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living, seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code. Defendant would justify his claim to the retention of the amount in question by invoking the terms of the insurance policy.


Issue: WON the mother is the rightful trustee for the minor beneficiary


Held: on Articles 320 and 321 of the Civil Code. The former provides: "The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. The property which the unemancipated child has acquired or may acquire with his work or industry, or by any lucrative title, belongs to the child in ownership, and in usufruct to the father or mother under whom he is under parental authority and whose company he lives.


With the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle


Source: FULL TEXT http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/jul1974/gr_l_25843_1974.html

Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956

Bacani Vs Nacoco [G.R. No. L-9657. November 29, 1956] 

Facts:  Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation, AssistantCorporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for Defendant ,requested said stenographers for copies of thetranscript of the stenographic notes taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of the fees in question.

Issue  : WON NACOCO is a Government Entity


Held:   They do not acquire that status for the simple reason that they donot come under the classification of municipal or public corporation. Take for instance the National CoconutCorporation. While it was organized with the purpose of ³adjusting the coconut industry to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States´ and of providing ³Facilities for the better curing of copra products and the proper utilization of coconut by-products´, a function which our government has chosen to exercise to promote thecoconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it wasmade subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that it mayexercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our government. As this Court hasaptly said, ³The mere fact that the Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public. the term ³Government of the Republic of the Philippines´ used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of thegovernment are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government. These are whatwe call municipal corporations. They do not include government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers, dutiesand liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not thereforecome within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules of Court

 Source : FULL TEXT http://www.scribd.com/doc/36132697/BACANI-vs-NAcoco

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978

FORTUNATO R. PAMIL vs. HONORABLE VICTORINO C. TELERON and REV. FR. MARGARITO R. GONZAGA G.R. No. L-34854 November 20, 1978 FACTS: Private respondent, Father Margarito R. Gonzaga, was, in 1971, elected to the position of municipal mayor of Alburquerque, Bohol. Therefore, he was duly proclaimed. A suit for quo warranto was then filed by petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, for his disqualification based on this Administrative Code provision: "In no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality." The suit did not prosper, respondent Judge sustaining the right of Father Gonzaga to the office of municipal mayor. He ruled that such statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971. The matter was then elevated to this Tribunal by petitioner. It is his contention that there was no such implied repeal, that it is still in full force and effect. Thus was the specific question raised.

ISSUE” WON the disqualification of the respondent based on Administrative Code provision Constitutional

HELD: The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious test. Here being an ecclesiastic and therefore professing a religious faith suffices to disqualify for a public office. There is thus an incompatibility between the Administrative Code provision relied upon by petitioner and an express constitutional mandate.

Benjamin Vidoriano Vs Elizalde Rope Workers union GR No. L-25246 September 12 1974

FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow “Membership union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement.” RA 3350 was enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows “ but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor organization” Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.

ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act – to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way to do it.