Linggo, Disyembre 4, 2011

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.) CASE DIGEST


Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank,
 G.R. No. 164301. October 19, 2011.


FACTS: On March 23, 2000, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed on January 20, 2000 by and between BPI, herein petitioner, and FEBTC.[   This Article and Plan of Merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on April 7, 2000.Pursuant to the Article and Plan of Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure recognized and salaries and benefits maintained. Respondent BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter - Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank is the exclusive bargaining agent of BPI’s rank and file employees in Davao City. The former FEBTC rank-and-file employees in Davao City did not belong to any labor union at the time of the merger.  Prior to the effectivity of the merger, or on March 31, 2000, respondent Union invited said FEBTC employees to a meeting regarding the Union Shop Clause of the existing CBA between petitioner BPI and respondent Union After the meeting called by the Union, some of the former FEBTC employees joined the Union, while others refused.  Later, however, some of those who initially joined retracted their membership. Respondent Union then sent notices to the former FEBTC employees who refused to join, as well as those who retracted their membership, and called them to a hearing regarding the matter.  When these former FEBTC employees refused to attend the hearing, the president of the Union requested BPI to implement the Union Shop Clause of the CBA and to terminate their employment pursuant thereto. After two months of management inaction on the request, respondent Union informed petitioner BPI of its decision to refer the issue of the implementation of the Union Shop Clause of the CBA to the Grievance Committee.  However, the issue remained unresolved at this level and so it was subsequently submitted for voluntary arbitration by the parties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the former FEBTC employees that were absorbed by petitioner upon the merger between FEBTC and BPI should be covered by the Union Shop Clause found in the existing CBA between petitioner and respondent Union.

HELD: All employees in the bargaining unit covered by a Union Shop Clause in their CBA with management are subject to its terms.  However, under law and jurisprudence, the following kinds of employees are exempted from its coverage, namely, employees who at the time the union shop agreement takes effect are bona fide members of a religious organization which prohibits its members from joining labor unions on religious grounds; employees already in the service and already members of a union other than the majority at the time the union shop agreement took effect; confidential employees who are excluded from the rank and file bargaining unit; and employees excluded from the union shop by express terms of the agreement.

ANTONIO Y. CABASARES VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO JR. (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011) CASE DIGEST


ANTONIO Y. CABASARES, VS JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, JR.,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
8th Judicial Region, Calbayog CityWestern Samar,
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1793. October 19, 2011


FACTS:The records disclose that on February 21, 1994, Cabasares filed a Complaint for Malicious Mischief against a certain Rodolfo Hebaya. s early as February 27, 2002, the case had been submitted for decision, but respondent judge had yet to render a decision by the time the complaint was filed on November 6, 2009respondent Judge claimed that he only came to know of the present administrative complaint against him on December 7, 2009, thru Atty. Elizabeth Tanchioco, head of the Performance Audit Team at MTCC, Calbayog City.  On the second day of the audit, he left for Tacloban City upon advice of his doctor and was confined at Divine Word Hospital because of high blood pressure from December 10-13, 2009.  Thereafter, he was on leave from December 14-17, 2009 and returned to work only on December 18, 2009. Since it was Christmas time and due to his heavy workload, the case slipped his mind Later, however, a decision on the case was prepared and promulgated on January 14, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge violates Section 15 Article VIII of the constitution.

HELD: A judge is expected to keep his own record of cases and to note therein the status of each case so that they may be acted upon accordingly and promptly. He must adopt a system of record management and organize his docket in order to bolster the prompt and effective dispatch of business. Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. Complementary to this constitutional provision is Canon 1, Rule 1.02, of the Code of Judicial Conduct which instructs that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Similarly, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and to decide cases within the required period.  All cases or matters must be decided or resolved by all lower courts within a period of three (3) months from submission. The Court, in its aim to dispense speedy justice, is not unmindful of circumstances that justify the delay in the disposition of the cases assigned to judges. It is precisely for this reason why the Court has been sympathetic to requests for extensions of time within which to decide cases and resolve matters and incidents related thereto. When a judge sees such circumstances before the reglementary period ends, all that is needed is to simply ask the Court, with the appropriate justification, for an extension of time within which to decide the case. Thus, a request for extension within which to render a decision filed beyond the 90-day reglementary period is obviously a subterfuge to both the constitutional edict and the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Evidently, respondent Judge failed to do any of these options.